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Freedom of Association and the
Public Sector Agency Shop: Ball v.
Detroit and Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education.
James M. Sullivan*
I.

Introduction

Few subjects excite as much controversy among labor attorneys
as agency shops,' free riders and right-to-work. For those who are
unfamiliar with this area of labor law, these issues are often difficult
to understand and their significance is not always fully appreciated.
For a full understanding of these issues, one must be aware that
American labor laws establish a duly certified union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for all employees within a certified bar* A.B., 1975, Hillsdale College; J.D., 1979, Georgetown University Law Center; Attorney, Marriott Corporation.
1. The following definitions formulated by Professor Haggard clarify the distinctions
among agency shop agreements and other forms of union security:
Closed Shop Agreement." An individual must be a member of the union in order to be
eligible for hire and must retain this membership as a condition of continued employment with the contracting employer.
Union Shop Agreement., An individual who is not a member of the union may be
hired but within a specified time after hire must become and remain a member as a
condition of continued employment with the contracting employer.
Maintenance-of-Membershi, Agreement. An employee who is a member of the union
at the beginning of the contract or who becomes a member during the term of the
contract is obligated to remain a member until the termination of the contract.
Agency Shop Agreement." An individual who is not a member of the union may be
hired and retained in employment without the necessity of becoming a member of
the union, but he is required to tender the equivalent of initiation fees and periodic
dues to the union as a condition of his continued employment with the contracting
employer.
Service Fee Agreement." An individual who is not a member of the union may be
hired and retained in employment without the necessity of becoming a member of
the union, but as a condition of employment he is required to tender to the union his
pro rata share of the costs incurred by the union in performing its statutory function
as the exclusive bargaining representative.
Irrevocable CheckoffAuthorization Agreement: An individual who elects to discharge
his financial obligation to the union by authorizing the employer to deduct money
from his paycheck and forward it to the union is bound to continue this authorization
(and the employer is bound to honor it) for a specified term.
T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF UNION SEcuRrrY AGREEMENTS 4-5 (1977).

gaining unit.2 Any benefits that a union obtains in collective bargaining flow to all members of the bargaining unit regardless of
whether they pay union dues. Since the majority rule principle in
collective bargaining can tend to ignore divergent minority interests,
the Supreme Court has recognized the duty of fair representation as
3
a legal protection for employees dissatisfied with the union.
Opponents of the exclusive representation principle argue that,
absent repeal of the exclusive represention provisions in the National
Labor Relations Act and other labor laws, the most practical protection for minority interests is to give dissenters the "right-to-work"
without paying union dues. They theorize that a union will diligently serve its constituents if the constituents have the right to quit
the union and withhold dues when they feel the union is not providing adequate representation on their behalf. In response, proponents
of the agency shop and other union security arrangements argue that
"right-to-work" enables non-union employees to become "free riders" who will reap the benefits conferred by collective bargaining
and then refuse to pay dues even when they are fully satisfied with
the benefits that the union has obtained on behalf of all of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Under section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, resolution of the controversy over the agency shop issue was left to the
political processes in each of the states.4 Pursuant to this section,
each state may enact right-to-work legislation prohibiting unions
and employers from including agency shop clauses in their collective
bargaining contracts. Few political struggles have attracted as much
attention as the efforts in the states legislatures to enact right-to-work
statutes or the occasional effort to repeal section 14(b) at the federal
level. In contrast, few prople are fully aware of the legal ramifications that arise in the courts from the agency shop/right-to-work issue.
The first Supreme Court opinion dealing with the agency
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1980).
3. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1975) (discussing the majority rule principle and the duty of fair representation). In Steele the union bargaining representative sought to amend its collective bargaining agreement in a manner that would
discriminate against black employees in the bargaining unit. 323 U.S. at 195. In response to
the black plaintiffs' request for relief, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act
implied a duty of fair representation and that the usual judicial remedies of an injunction and
damages would be appropriate for breach of that duty. Id at 207.
In Emporium Capwell, black employees who were dissatisfied with the union grievance
process sought to bargain directly with their employer and were fired for their activities. 420
U.S. at 51-5. The Court refused to consider the black employees' activities to be protected by
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act because the union has a legitimate interest in
protecting its "strength [from dissipation] and its stature [from denigration] by subgroups
within the unit separately pursuing what they see as separate interests." Id at 70.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1980).

shop/right-to-work issue appeared in 1960 with the filing of the decision in InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street.5 The Court has
continued to develop this area with the decisions in Railway Clerks v.
7
Allen6 and most recently, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.
These cases involved dissenting employees who were compelled by
collective bargaining contracts to contribute dues or agency shop
fees to their union bargaining representatives. These employees argued that the unions violated their first amendment right of free association by using their dues or fees for objectionable political and
ideological activities. After two decades, the case law on the agency
shop issue finally appears to be crystallizing.
In Abood the Supreme Court defined the first amendment rights
at issue and the standards to be applied in resolving agency shop
disputes between dissenters and their bargaining representatives.
Perhaps because of the division among the Justices,8 the Abood
Court left the responsibility for creating a remedy for these disputes
to the lower courts. Ball v. Detroit9 is the first response by a state
court to the invitation in Abood for the creation of an appropriate
remedy for unconstitutional union spending.
In Ball, the Michigan Court of Appeals held: First, when nonunion members object to their bargaining representative's political
and ideological activities, the objecting non-members' agency shop
fees should be held in escrow until the union proves the amount of
its spending on legitimate collective bargaining activities; second, after the union proves that amount, the objecting non-members are
entitled to a refund of the remaining proportion of the fees; third, the
employee's future fees should then be reduced by that amount; and
last, the union must make additional reductions to correspond with
future fluctuations in its political and ideological spending above the
amount determined in the judicial proceeding. Since Ball has already been followed by a federal court decision on the agency shop
issue under the National Labor Relations Act,'I the practical impact
5. 367 U.S. 741 (1960).
6. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
7. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
8. The Court's opinion in Abood was joined by six Justices, but Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist wrote concurring opinions. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion expressed concern
about the proper remedy and Justice Rehnquist's opinion criticized the inconsistency between
the Court's opinion and the plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's opinion that sharply criticized
the Court's opinion and only concurred in the Court's judgment.
9. 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978).
10. Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979). In Beck, the report of the special
master found that the defendant union was only able to prove that a mere nineteen percent of
its $29,240,000 expenditures in fiscal year 1977-78 were for permissible purposes. The special
master therefore concluded that the defendant union must return eighty-one percent of the
amounts paid by plaintiffs as agency fees. Report of the Special Master filed Aug. 18, 1980,
Civil No. M-76-839 at 40-1.

of the Ball decision may exceed the practical impact of Abood on the
political power of unions financing their political activities partly
from funds unconstitutionally collected from non-members.
This article will synopsize the Ball case, analyze its four part
holding and discuss the consistency of the remedies in Ball with the
Abood opinion and traditional constitutional principles.
II.

The Facts

In April 1970, the City of Detroit and the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) signed an
agency shop agreement that made payment of service fees to
AFSCME a condition of employment with the City of Detroit." t In
June 1970, Robert Ball and sixty-four other non-union employees
who were subject to that agreement brought suit against Detroit and
AFSCME in the Wayne County Circuit Court.' 2 The plaintiffs in
Ball argued that the agency shop agreement constituted a violation
of their first amendment right of free association' 3 and the Michigan
11. 84 Mich. App. 383, 387, 269 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1978). The agency shop agreement
included language dealing with dues and service fee check-off in addition to the following
provisions:
Any person who was certified and employed with the City on or after October 11,
1947 and is covered by this Agreement who is not a member of the aforesaid Union
and who does not make application for membership before July 1, 1970 shall, as a
condition of employment, pay to the Union each month starting with the first payroll
date on or after July 1, 1970, a service charge as a contribution toward the administration of this Agreement in an amount equal to the regular monthly Union membership dues of aforesaid Union. Employees who fail to comply with this requirement
shall be discharged by the employer within thirty (30) days after receipt of written
notice to the employer from the Union, Unless the City is otherwise notified by the
Union in writing within said thirty (30) days.
Any person who becomes an employee of the City on or after July 1, 1970, and is
covered by this agreement who is not a member of aforesaid Union and does not
make application for membership within sixty (60) days from the date of employment, shall, as a condition of employment, pay to the union each month a service
charge as a contribution towards the administration of this Agreement, in an amount
equal to the regular monthly union membership dues of aforesaid union. Such service charge shall be paid on or after his 91st day of employment. Employees who fail
to comply with this requirement shall be discharged by the employer within thirty
(30) days after receipt of written notice to the employer from the Union, unless the
City is otherwise notified by the Union in writing within said thirty (30) days.
Ball v. Detroit, No. 159-940, slip op. at 8-11 (Cir. Ct. for Wayne Co. Mich., Mar. 31, 1975).
12. 84 Mich. App. 383, 387, 269 N.W.2d 607, 609. Non-members are subject to the
agreement despite their lack of consent because the union has been granted the statutory privilege of being the exclusive bargaining representative. Under Michigan's statutory scheme for
collective bargaining for public employees
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized by the employer .
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.26 (1978).

13. In Abood, the United States Supreme Court recognized that payment of an agency
shop fee did involve the first amendment right of free association. 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1960). In his dissent in InternationalAss'nof
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 741 (1960), Justice Black explained the first amendment right at
issue and argued that Street should have been decided directly on a constitutional basis:

Public Employment Relations Act (PERA).' 4 In Smigel v. Southgate
School District, the Michigan Supreme Court had previously ruled
that agency shop agreements were repugnant to the PERA.' 5 Consequently, the Wayne County Circuit Judge in Ball issued a permarestraining enforcement of the agency shop
nent injunction
6
agreement.'
In June 1973, however, the Michigan Legislature nullified the
Smigel ruling by amending the PERA to authorize agency shop
agreements. ' After that amendment, the City of Detroit and the
AFSCME local agreed to a new agency shop clause, and the City
notified all employees in the AFSCME local's bargaining unit that
they must either join the union, pay the agency shop fee, or face
dismissal.' 8 After procedural skirmishing over modifying the outstanding injunction, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege the
unconstitutionality of PERA's 1973 amendment."' Ball v. Detroit
was tried in early 1975 and in March, the trial court ruled that the
agency shop agreement had violated the original PERA.20 The court
ordered the union to refund $34,060.85 to the employees who had
illegally been forced to pay the service fees prior to 1973 while the
original PERA was in effect. 2 ' On the other hand, the trial court
construed the new, amended PERA to permit collection of service
fees for collective bargaining activities but not for political activities.
AFSCME was therefore ordered to refund the political spending
portion of fees that had been paid by objecting plaintiffs after June
1973.22
Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating this [First]
Amendment, pass a law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even lawyers), to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored
by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes.
Compelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates or advocate laws or
doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at all, from compelling him by laws to
speak for a candidate, a party, or a cause he is against. The very reason for the First
Amendment is to make the people of this country free to think, speak, write and
worship as they wish, not as the Government commands.
Id at 788.
14. MICH. STAT. AN. § 17.455(10) (Callaghan 1970) (current version at MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (1978)).
15. 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).
16. 84 Mich. App. at 387, 269 N.W.2d at 609.
17. Id at 387-88, 269 N.W.2d at 609. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (1978) provides:
. . . That nothing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative as defined in Section II to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the
bargaining unit pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee
equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive
bargaining representative ...
18. 84 Mich. App. at 388-89, 269 N.W.2d at 610.
19. Id at 389, 269 N.W.2d at 610.
20. Id at 389-90, 269 N.W.2d at 610.
21. Id at 389, 269 N.W.2d at 610; Ball v. Detroit, No. 159-940, slip op. at 28, 51 (Cir. Ct.
for Wayne Co., Mich., Mar. 31, 1975).
22. 84 Mich. App. at 389, 269 N.W.2d at 610; Ball v. Detroit No. 159-940, slip op. at 51
(Cir. Ct. for Wayne Co., Mich., Mar. 31, 1975).

Plaintiffs appealed the decision because the trial court had accepted the union's unsupported assertion that the political spending
proportion was only one percent of the agency shop fees.23 Moreover, plaintiffs wanted a refund of fees spent on other non-collective
bargaining activities such as the promotion of the union's religious
and economic views.24 The Michigan Court of Appeals postponed
its decision in Ball until July 1978 because the United States
Supreme Court had recently noted probable
jurisdiction in Abood,25
26
a case involving the same issues as Ball.
In Abood, non-union teachers and counselors had challenged
the legality and constitutionality of an agency shop agreement that
made financial support of the Detroit Federation of Teachers a condition of employment with Detroit's public schools.27 In March
1975, the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed the Abood plaintiffs
in an opinion giving the amended PERA a broader construction
than the Ball trial court had given the statute.2 8 The Ball trial court
narrowly construed the amended PERA to permit collection of service fees only for collective bargaining activities and not for ideological activities.2 9 The court chose to construe the statute narrowly in
order to avoid possible conflict with the Constitution.3 ° In contrast
to the Ball decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals in its March
1975 decision of Abood broadly construed the amended PERA to
permit agency shop agreements that compelled financial support of
the union's ideological activities as well as its collective bargaining
activities. 3' The plaintiffs in Abood appealed, arguing that such a
broad construction of the PERA violated their first amendment right
of free association. The Michigan Supreme Court denied review,
but the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
April 1976.32 Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals postponed the
hearing of oral argument in Ball until after the Supreme Court ren33
dered a decision in Abood
23. 84 Mich. App. at 389-90, 269 N.W.2d at 610.
24. Id at 395, 269 N.W.2d at 612.
25. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
26. 84 Mich. App. at 390, 269 N.W.2d at 610.
27. 431 U.S. 209, 212, 214 (1977).
28. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 99, 230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1975),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
29. Ball v. Detroit, No. 159-940, slip op. at 41-42 (Cir. Ct. for Wayne Co., Mich., Mar. 31,
1975).
30. Id at 41 (by inference from the court's reliance on Street).
31. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 99, 230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1975),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
32. 431 U.S. at 215-216.
33. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. at 392-93, 269 N.W.2d at 611.

The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Abood on May 23, 1977. The Court held that the first amendment
right of free association prohibited use of non-union members' service fees for activities unrelated to collective bargaining.3 4 In light of
the conflict between the Court's interpretation of the first amendment and the Michigan court's authoritative construction of the
36
PERA,3 5 the Supreme Court found that the PERA was overbroad.
Nevertheless, the Court did not strike down the statute. 37 It merely
34. The Court included grievance-adjustment and contract-administration together with
collective bargaining as permissible activities. 431 U.S. at 232. Nevertheless, for ease in communication one can refer to all of those permissible activities as collective bargaining activities,
while all impermissible activities can be referred to as non-collective bargaining activities. See
431 U.S. at 236-77.
Professor Haggard explained the Abood decision as follows:
Relying on the Street doctrine to the effect that the use of the compulsory dues for
political purposes was constitutionally impermissible, the plaintiffs in Abood argued
that since everything a public employee union did was, by definition, political, the
agency shop fee in the public sector was itself totally unconstitutional. The Court
accepted the plaintiffs' premise but rejected its inference. The Court noted that
"there can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee unions attempt to influence governmental policy-making, their activities - and the views of
members who disagree with them - may be properly termed political." But the
Court nevertheless concluded that public employees could be required to support the
unions in these political activities. The Court's reasoning in this regard is obscure at
best.
T. Haggard, supra note 1, at 263-64. See also note 8 supra.. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976), the plurality held that public employment cannot be conditioned on membership in a
political party. Since public employees' unions also exercise significant influence on government policies, Elrod's holding is extremely difficult to reconcile with Abood's holding that
public employment can be conditioned on financial support of a union.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens insisted that "the Court's opinion does not foreclose the argument that the Union should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will
be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining."
431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell's opinion criticizing
most of the plurality opinion, but concurring in the decision that the Michigan court's judgment should be vacated. 431 U.S. at 244. Justice Powell argued that
Under First Amendment principles that have become settled since Hanson and Street
were decided, it is now clear, first, that any withholding of financial support for a
public sector union is within the protection of the First Amendment; and second, that
the State bears the burden of proving that any union dues or fees that it requires of
nonunion employees are needed to serve paramount governmental interests.
Id at 255 (emphasis added). Powell criticized the plurality since under its decision, "a nonunion employee who would vindicate his First Amendment rights apparently must initiate a
proceeding to prove that the union has allocated some portion of its budget to 'ideological
activities unrelated to collective bargaining."'" Id at 263-64.
35. The Michigan court's construction of the state statute was authoritative. The
Supreme Court, therefore, could not reconstrue the statute because principles of federalism
dictate that state courts are entitled to the last word on the interpretation of statutes. Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
36. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 232-37. The Court said that the
Michigan Court of Appeals' dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was "unduly restrictive." 1d at
240. One can infer that the statute, therefore, was unduly restrictive and overbroad as authoritatively construed by the Michigan courts.
37. ContrastAbood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), with Hynes v. Oradell,
425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) ("we conclude that Ordinance No. 598A must fall") and Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("it is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute").
Professor Tribe recognized that the statute in Abood was overbroad, but he was wrong in
concluding that the statute was struck down. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589

vacated the judgment of the Michigan court in Abood and remanded
the case for the creation of an appropriate remedy.38
After the Supreme Court's decision in Abood, the Michigan
Court of Appeals heard oral argument in Ball and announced its
decision on July 5, 1978, more than eight years after the original
complaint had been filed.39 Since Ball involved the same issues as
the remanded Abood case,' the Ball decision creates the relief that
the Supreme Court anticipated when it remanded Abood Furthermore, the Ball opinion clarifies several aspects of the Abood decision.
III.
A.

The Opinions
Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies

In Abood, the Supreme Court commented that because the defendant union had adopted an internal remedy, it might be "appro-

priate under Michigan law, even if not strictly required by any
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, to defer further judicial proceedings pending the voluntary utilization by the parties of that internal
remedy as a possible means of settling the dispute."'" Because the
defendant union in Ball had adopted a similar internal remedy, 42 the
Michigan Court of Appeals squarely confronted the issue of whether
it should defer judicial proceedings and force the plaintiffs to exhaust the union's procedures even though plaintiffs were non-members.4 3 The court concluded that "where fundamental constitutional
rights are asserted," the exhaustion of remedies doctrine does not
preclude plaintiffs from seeking relief in the courts.44
(1978). The statute can be regarded as "struck down" only in the limited sense that after
Abood, the lower court's construction cannot operate as a basis for dismissing the plaintiffs'
claim. The statute was not struck down in the traditional sense that the legislature must write
new legislation in order to achieve its goals.
38. 431 U.S. at 242.
39. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978).
40. Id at 392-93, 269 N.W.2d at 611.
41. 431 U.S. at 242. The defendant union's allegations provided the basis for the Court's
description of the union rebate scheme:
Under the procedure adopted by the Union, as explained in the appellees' brief, a
dissenting employee may protest at the beginning of each school year the expenditure
of any part of his agency-shop fee for 'activities or causes of a political nature or
involving controversial issues of public importance only incidentally related to
wages, hours, and conditions of employment."' The employee is then entitled to a
pro rata refund of his service charge in accordance with the calculation of the portion
of total Union expenses for the specified purposes. The calculation is made in the
first instance by the Union, but is subject to review by an impartial board.
431 U.S. 209, 242 n.41 (1977).
42. 84 Mich. App. at 393, 269 N.W.2d at 612.
43. Id at 393-94, 269 N.W.2d at 612.
44. Id at 394, 269 N.W.2d at 612 (citing Kewin v. Melvindale Bd. of Educ., 65 Mich.
App. 472, 477-79, 237 N.W.2d 514, 517-18 (1975); Barry v. Flint Fire Dept., 44 Mich. App. 602,
205 N.W.2d 627 (1973)). In Beck v. CWA, a federal court was confronted with the same issue
under the National Labor Relations Act, 468 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Md. 1979). The Beck court
did not reach the constitutional issues involved and refused to stay judicial proceedings be-

The Ball court thus clarified the meaning of Abood's comments
on exhaustion of remedies. Although some of its remarks suggest a
contrary intent,45 the Abood Court probably did not intend to force
plaintiffs to exhaust union remedies because the Court referred to
"voluntary" utilization of the internal remedies by the parties.'
Such a reading of Abood follows the intent of the Court in Railway Clerks v. Allen,47 in which the Court ordered the lower court to
grant relief to the objecting non-union members and assured them
that "It]he courts will not shrink from affording what remedies they
may .
*"48 Allen was a political spending/union shop case like
Abood, but it arose under the Railway Labor Act. 49 The Allen court
did not suggest that the union's adoption of internal remedies would
preclude judicial relief pending dissenters' exhaustion of union remedies. Instead, it commented that the costs of litigation and the relief
granted to dissenters in such cases should "encourage" the unions to
avoid the expense of prolonged litigation by making "available a
simple procedure for allowing dissenters to be excused from having
50
to pay the political spending proportion of service fees."
Precluding judicial avenues of relief and forcing plaintiffs to exhaust the union's internal proceedings would invert fundamental
principles of justice, because plaintiffs are seeking to avoid forced
association with the union. 5 Furthermore, a defendant is traditioncause it appeared that requiring exhaustion of the union's internal remedy would not promote
settlement of the dispute and would cause unnecessary delay. Id
45. The Court commented that if the dissenters are dissatisfied with the constitutionality
of the union's internal remedy, then they would be entitled to "judicial consideration of the
adequacy of the remedy." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 242 n.45 (1977). This
comment suggests that dissenters' access to the courts should be conditioned upon exhaustion
of the union remedies.
46. 431 U.S. at 242.
47. 373 U.S. 113 (1963). This case was an action by non-union railway employees
against labor unions and the railway to restrain enforcement of union shop provisions on the
grounds that money exacted from employees under the agreement was being used to finance
political activities contrary to the Railway Labor Act and state right-to-work law.
48. Id at 124.
49. 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1978).
50. 373 U.S. 113, 122-23.
51. The first amendment's prohibition against forced association may provide a constitutional argument against requiring non-members to exhaust internal union remedies. Undoubtedly many dissenters refuse to join the union precisely because they dislike associating
with members of the union, visiting the union hall or being subjected to the union's disciplinary proceedings. Unless the dissenters were willing to communicate all of their arguments in
writing or through an attorney, the exhaustion requirement would force dissenters into
presenting their arguments before union tribunals at locations and times probably chosen by
the union. It is unlikely that many dissenters would be willing to take the time either to submit
written arguments to the union or to hire an attorney, since the individual amount of recovery
will probably be rather small. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
795-96 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (plausible to dismiss workers' claims as de minimis when
measured only in dollars and cents).
Thus, requiring exhaustion of remedies would force many dissenters into the dilemma of
choosing whether to give up their right of physical nonassociation in exchange for the opportunity to protect their right not to associate through financial support of objectionable union
ideological activities. Absent a compelling state interest, dissenters should not be forced into

ally not permitted to judge the merits of his adversary's claims.52
Requiring non-members to exhaust union remedies would also
ignore important Supreme Court decisions recognizing the commonlaw assumption that union rules and the exhaustion of remedies doctrine apply only to union members. 3 In Booster Lodge No. 405,
IAM v. NLRB5 4 and in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board Textile
Workers," the Court held that a fine imposed by the union on a
worker for conduct occurring after he resigned from the union would
not be enforced by the courts. The Court explained, "When there is
a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no
more control over the former member than it has over the man in the
street."5 6 Thus, Ball's rejection of the exhaustion requirement is
consistent with the logic of Booster Lodge and Granite State, since
non-members should not be required to submit to union procedures.
The practical danger in requiring exhaustion of remedies has
been noted by the Supreme Court in a decision rejecting the exhaustion requirement for union members whose complaints touch on issues in the public domain rather than internal union affairs. "If the
member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of
public policy are never reached and an airing of the grievances never
had."5 7
The first amendment doctrine of prior restraint also requires resuch a dilemma. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977) (dissenters
should not be confronted with dilemma of relinquishing either associational rights or right to
keep political beliefs private). The portion of each dissenter's agency fee spent on ideological
activities might seem small, but even the small amount of coercion resulting from forced association may destroy the dissenters' willingness to exercise their first amendment right not to
permit their agency fees to be spent on noncollective bargaining activities. Cf Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (burden of delayed adjudication of obscenity may operate to
deny completely right to judicial review where distributor's stake in any one picture may be
minimal). Moreover, the coercive effect of requiring exhaustion of remedies may not always
be so minimal since the response to complaints about union expenditures may range from
ridicule to vicious harassment. See Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974,
893 n.12 (8th Cir. 1971) and 486 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1973) (dissent over union expenditures
resulted in vicious harassment, loss of employment justifying damages of $92,000.).
52. See Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). See also In re Murchison, in
which the Court said, "no one can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome." 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (violation of due
process where same judge who sat as the Michigan "judge-grand jury" also presided at witness's contempt hearing).
53. Under the common law, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine cannot be applied to
non-union members because the exhaustion doctrine is based on principles of consent embodied in the contractual nature of the relationship between the member and his union. See, e.g.,
Martin v. United Slate Roofers, 196 Md. 428, 440, 77 A.2d 136, 141 (1950) (exhaustion requirement for member justified because union constitution is a contract between members). Since
non-members do not consent to union proceedings, non-members should never have to exhaust those proceedings.
54. 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
55. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
56. Id at 217-18.
57. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Ship Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968)
(union acted wrongfully in expelling member who refused to exhaust internal remedies before
filing unfair labor practice charge alleging union discrimination).

jection of the exhaustion requirement in Ball. The dissenters' first
amendment right of free association was infringed in Ball by the
union and the employer through the collection of excess agency fees.
If a court permitted such unconstitutional compulsion pending exhaustion of an extra-judicial remedy, the court would be permitting
a restraint of first amendment rights prior to any judicial determination of the validity of the restraint.
In a different context, the Supreme Court has explained that
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. We
have tolerated such a system only where it operated under judicial
superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint." 8 Using this standard, the
exhaustion requirement fails for three reasons.
First, the standard of judicial review for union adjudicatory
proceedings is merely "some evidence" rather than the "substantial
evidence" standard of review set by the Administrative Procedure
Act.5 9 This lower standard of review cannot constitute adequate judicial supervision where fundamental rights are at stake. Second,
the lack of immediate judicial determination of the validity of the
restraint violates prior restraint standards.6 0 The union appellate
procedures, for example, could easily take more than the four
months permitted under the federal Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act.6" Finally, the "loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury."" Clearly, dissenters would suffer such injury
because under a rebate procedure the Union would temporarily control the funds unconstitutionally collected from the dissenters.
The due process requirement of a fair tribunal is an additional
constitutional consideration that dictates against requiring the dissenting non-members to exhaust internal union remedies. An internal union remedy would allow determination of the constitutional
dividing line between permissible and impermissible spending by
union personnel. If the courts were to delegate to the defendant
union the power to decide how much financial support it could collect from nonmembers the fundamental role of the judiciary would
be in jeopardy. Such a delegation of judicial power to a private institution, interested in and affected by, the outcome of its decisions
58. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1962) (cited in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965)).
59. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 250 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("I agree that a court does not sit in review of a union as it does of an administrative agency.") Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1978).
60. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1965).
61. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1978).
62. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

would ignore both legal precedent and canons of ethics insuring the
impartiality of judicial officers. 63 The court in Semancik v. UMW,
in discussing union proceedings against its members held that "A
tribunal of the political opponents of those on trial offends our most
basic notions of fairness [and unless some other group were provided
to hear these cases] there would never be the semblance of impartial'65
ity which due process requires.
B.

Burden of Proof

In the second part of the Ball opinion, the Michigan Court of
Appeals strictly applied Abood's rulings on burden of proof.66 The
Ball court explained that a prima facie case is established once a
non-member indicates his or her objection to the use of any portion
of the service fee for non-collective bargaining purposes. 67 The court
emphasized that "dissenting employees need not 'prove' their objections [to union spending] in the same sense that they must testify as
to why they object or testify as to the specific activities and causes to
which they object. ' 68 After the employee establishes his prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the union to document the proportion of
dissenters' service fees used for legitimate activities because the
union possesses the facts and records documenting its expenditures. 69 Even though the union must carry the burden of proof under Ball, the dissenters still have the burden of initiating litigation
and establishing a prima facie case.7 °
Abood also required that dissenters only indicate their objection
to
63. See note 52 supra.
64. 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
65. Id at 157.
66. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. at 394-96, 269 N.W.2d at 612-13.
67. Id at 394-95, 269 N.W.2d at 612.
68. Id at 396, 269 N.w.2d at 613. The court expressly noted the trial court's error in
requiring the union to establish the level of its spending for only the single category of political
activities. Plaintiffs are entitled to refund of fees spent on other illegitimate activities in addition to political activities. Consequently, on remand, instead of proving the amount of spending for only one type of illegitimate activity, the union must carry the burden of proving the
amount of spending for legitimate collective bargaining activities. That way, the remaining
proportion of the fees spent on all types of non-collective bargaining activities can be refunded.
69. Id at 394, 269 N.W.2d at 612. Such minimal requirements for the prima facie case
are further justified because the non-members have already manifested their objection to the
union's activities by refusing to join the union. But see International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774 (1961) (dissent is not to be presumed; it must be affirmatively asserted).
70. See Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Md. 1979) (involving unconstitutional
union spending under the National Labor Relations Act). In Beck, the defendant union
moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claim on the ground that they had failed to direct formal letters of
protest to the union with regard to the union's political spending. The Beck court denied the
union's motion because the plaintiffs had protested by filing suit and "[aill that is required is
that the individual dissenter make known his position so that, in fairness to the union, no one
who does noi object to the union's expenditures is able to secure relief." Id

ideological expenditures of any sort that are unrelated to collective
bargaining. To require greater specificity would confront an individual employee with the dilemma of relinquishing either his right
to withhold his support of ideological causes to which he objects
or his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure. It would also place on each employee the considerable burden of monitoring all of the numerous and shifting expenditures
made by the Union that are unrelated to its duties as exclusive
bargaining representative."
Under Abood, the allegations in the complaint supply sufficient indication of the non-members' dissent and the Union must then bear
the burden of proving the amount of permissible spending.7 2 Moreover, as Justice Powell observed in his concurring opinion, "Under
today's decision, a nonunion employee who would vindicate his First
Amendment rights apparently must initiate a proceeding to prove
that the union has allocated some portion of its budget to ideological
activities unrelated to collective bargaining."7 3 Thus, the Ball remedy conforms to Abood's discussion of burden shifting in all respects.
Although Ball's burden shifting meets the standards of Abood,
the first amendment overbreadth doctrine prohibits the dissenters
from bearing the burden of establishing a prima facie case as a prerequisite to exercising their fundamental rights.7 4 Requiring dissenters to carry the burden of litigation discourages, and therefore
infringes upon their right to associate freely. Under the overbreadth
doctrine, an infringement of fundamental rights can only be justified
if it is the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling state
interest. 5
The Abood court ruled that there was sufficient state interest to
justify infringement of first amendment rights to the extent of compelling financial support of collective bargaining, 6 but the court
failed to inquire whether the PERA had embodied the least restrictive means to achieve its objective.77 Collective bargaining statutes
for public employment in other states use less restrictive means than
71. 431 U.S. at 241.
72. Id at 237, 239 (citing Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118-19, & n.6
(1963)).
73. 431 U.S. at 263-64 (Powell, J., concurring).
74. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration requirement is unconstitutional burden on union organizer's first amendment rights). Cf.Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301 (1965) (unconstitutional burden for government to require addressee to request

delivery of foreign unsealed mail detained by the Post Office as communist political propaganda).
75.

E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be

the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms"); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
76. 431 U.S. at 225-29.
77. Vieira, Book Review, 29 S.C.L. REV. 437, 446 (1978) (reviewing T. Haggard, Com-

pulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts: A Legal Analysis of Union Security Agreements).

the PERA for achieving the agency shop goals,7 8 and at least one
commentator has proposed another workable, less restrictive alternative to the PERA agency shop scheme. 9 Since the PERA was not
the least restrictive alternative when Ball and Abood were decided,
overbreadth analysis would have required the courts to strike down
the statute and force the Michigan Legislature to pass a less restrictive statute.8 0 Nonetheless, within four months of the Ball decision,
the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) expanded Ball's construction of the PERA and interpreted the statute
in a less restrictive vein.
The MERC case that helped protect dissenters' rights was Garden City School District (Chamberlain).'t The facts of Garden City
are similar to those in Ball A public school teachers' union and the
Garden City School District had agreed to a contract that was invalid on its face because it required all bargaining unit teachers to either join the union or pay union service fees equivalent to union
membership dues and assessments.8 2 MERC first ruled that by executing and enforcing a contract which illegally required the payment
of "assessments" in addition to dues, both Garden City School District and the union committed an unfair labor practice in violation of
Section 10(l)(c) of the PERA."3 (An example of an assessment that
non-members could not be required to pay was a special purpose fee
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (1978) (providing mechanism for determining non-members' proper service fee).
79. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 589 (1978) (a better solution might be
to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining from voluntary contributions).
80. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960). According to Professor Vieira:
On its face, the typical compulsory unionism arrangement is the most, not the
least, restrictive means to achieve whatever public purpose (if any) forced unionism
serves, since it requires the aggrieved employees, rather than the union or the employer to take expensive and time-consuming action to protect rights that everyone
admits no union has any privilege to disregard. For that reason alone, the typical
statute sanctioning such a result (albeit sub silentio) should be absolutely invalid and
incapable of judicial rehabilitation. Compare United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368-70 (1971), With Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-28
(1972). Compare Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154, 162-64 (1971), with Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216-17 (1975). See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("[I]t is for Congress, not
this Court, to rewrite the statute."); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 &
n.20 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514-16 (1964).
Vieira, supra note 77, at 447.
81. 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 1145, [1978] 788 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 15.
82. Id at 1152.
83. Id at 115 1. Section 10(l)(c) of the PERA is an unfair labor practice provision similar to section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. CompareMICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.210(l)(c) (1978) with 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1978). Under Abood, the agency shop contract may not actually require non-members to pay the equivalent of full union dues; it may
only require non-members to pay for the proportionate costs of collective bargaining, grievance-adjustment and contract-administration. 431 U.S. at 232. A non-member can be easily

confused if the collective contract says that he must pay "agency fees equivalent to union
dues." MERC should require unions and employers to substitute the words "proportionate
costs of collective bargaining, grievance-adjustment and contract-administration"

for the

levied to support striking teachers in another school district.) 4 In
Garden City's second major ruling, MERC rejected the dissenters'
argument that the contract could not require agency shop payments
for a local union's parent organizations (Michigan Education Association and National Education Association) when membership in the
parent organizations
is required to maintain membership in the local
5

union.

MERC also ruled, however, that the contract was subject to the

Abood limitation that prohibited agency shop clauses from requiring
non-members to finance anything more than the costs of collective
bargaining activities.86 Since the dissenters in Garden City had
lodged general objections to the union's non-bargaining activities,
the burden was on the union to show that the agency fees conformed
to the Abood standards.8 7 Because the unions failed to justify their
expenditures, MERC ordered the Ball remedy and noted that:
current owing fees and amounts payable in the future may not be
collected from these Charging Parties until some neutral forum
has adjudicated the proper amount of the agency-shop fee permitwords "agency fees equivalent to union dues" in all contracts negotiated following the Abood
decision.
84. 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. at 1153 (citing NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, 307 F.2d 3 (3d
Cir. 1962). Under prior law, initiation fees cannot be required of non-members. Teamsters
Local 328 (Starrine), 1976 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 167. Strike fund fees had also been levied on
non-members, and MERC held those fees to be illegal as to dissenters because the strike fund
was administered to assist members only. 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 1154. MERC expressly
declined to decide whether the strike fund fee was an assessment, so its holding can be interpreted to stand for the proposition that non-members can only be required to contribute for
union programs that provide benefit to non-members as well as members. Id at 1153-54.
Under Abood, the contract can only require non-members to support the costs of collective bargaining, grievance-adjustment, and contract-administration. 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
These are nebulous concepts and will be difficult to define. Id at 236.
In Garden City, MERC noted that "[tihe agency-shop concept is justified on the grounds
that non-member employees can be required to 'share fairly in the financial support of the
exclusive bargaining representative,' PERA, Section 10(2), but their 'fair share' cannot encompass payment for benefits they are ineligible to receive." 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. at 1154.
This logic would seem to dictate that non-members can be compelled to finance only
those union activities that the union justifies as benefitting the non-members. Cf. Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 236 n.33 (noting question of whether non-members must
finance "social activities" from which they are allegedly excluded). The "benefit test," therefore, seems to define the parameters of collective bargaining, grievance-adjustment, and contract administration. Cf. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (order
granting summary judgment in political spending suit under the Railway Labor Act lists noncollective bargaining activities).
85. 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. at 1155. Still, agency fees for the parent organizations can
only be required to the extent that the parent organization contributes to the local union's
collective bargaining contract administration and grievance adjustment. Id at 1155-56.
MERC states that the parents state-wide and nation-wide involvement in those activities is
relevant to determining their agency fees. Id. at 1155-56. If this dicta suggests that the union's
burden of proof is satisfied merely by establishing averages that might presumptively apply to
dissenters, then it is not supported by Ball. Ball'r strict proof requirements strongly suggest
that the union must prove the actualcosts of collective bargaining. 84 Mich. App. at 394-96,
269 N.W.2d at 612-13 (1978). Cf. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746,
753-54 (1963) (non-member cannot be required to subsidize union's institutional activities).
86. 1978 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. at 1151.
87. Id at 1151, 1156.

ted under Abood These charging parties have adequately stated
their objections to the agency-shop fee and will not be required to
renew their objections continuingly. The burden is now on the
[unions] to show the proper amount of the agency-shop fee to
which they are entitled, either before this Commission or in a
court of general jurisdiction.8"
The unions had attempted to cause the discharge of the dissenters for
failure to pay dues, and MERC found this to be an unfair labor
practice.8 9
The above ruling on the unfair labor practice is the most significant aspect of Garden City. Because of this ruling, if a union fails to
justify its expenditures, yet attempts to cause the discharge of a dissenting non-member, MERC can assume the burden of protecting
the dissenting non-member by litigating an unfair labor practice
against the union.' Before Garden City, the PERA placed on the
dissenters the burden of protecting their freedom of association by
litigating in court, a result that is clearly overly restrictive. 9 '
Despite concern that MERC may not diligently protect dissenters' rights, the Garden City and Ball remedies are probably the best
available cure for the initial overbreadth of the PERA. While nullification of a statute has been the traditional cure for overbreadth, the
Supreme Court seems unwilling to strike down agency shop or union
shop provisions.9 2 In Street9 3 and Allen94 the Court strained to give

the Railway Labor Act an artificially narrow construction that permitted the Court to avoid striking down that statute's union shop
provision. 95 Moreover, under the Court's construction of the National Labor Relations Act, union shop agreements are permitted to
require "membership" as a condition of employment only because of
the Court's arcane definition of "membership as whittled down to its
financial core."9 6
Furthermore, in Abood the Court was extremely reluctant to
strike down an agency shop provision. Even though the state court's
overbroad construction of the statute was authoritative under the
88.
89.

Id at 1157.
Id at 1151.
90. Cf.[1978] 788 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 15.
91. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration requirement is unconstitutional burden on union organizer's first amendment rights). Cf.; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (unconstitutional burden for government to require addressee to
request delivery of foreign unsealed mail detained by Post Office as communist political propaganda). See generaly Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadh Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv.
844 (1970).
92. See T. Haggard, supra note 1, at 267. (the courts have been reluctant to apply constitutional doctrines in restraint of union security.)
93. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
94. 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
95. See Abood v. Detroit Bd.of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 248 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
96. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of

Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977) (under federal law, union shop is practical equivalent of
agency shop).

Pullman doctrine,9 7 the Court refused plaintiffs request to void the
statute and thereby force the legislature to write a new, constitutional
statute. 98 Instead, the Court vacated the lower court's judgment dismissing the claim and remanded the case with instructions to the
lower court to create a remedy that would prevent the statute from
being used in violation of the Constitution.9 9 Essentially, by remanding the case the Supreme Court was requiring the Michigan
courts to revise the statute by adding a remedy requirement that
would cure the overbreadth of the earlier construction. In Ball and
Garden City, the Michigan Court of Appeals' and MERC's remedies
were the added, less restrictive constructions that were necessary to
cure PERA's overbreadth.
The Abood court's failure to strike down the statute reflects a
balancing of mere statutory interests against fundamental constitutional interests. o Accordingly, the state interest in coercing service
fees from non-members was measured by the standard of "important" rather than "compelling"' 0 ' state interests. Although it is by
no means clear that the Supreme Court used the word "important"
to signal a lower standard of scrutiny than "compelling," the imprecise use of words may encourage lower courts to adopt new, lower
standards of review that dilute the traditional overbreadth standards.0 2 A further reflection of the Court's balancing approach
comes from Abood's reliance on Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson 10 3 and Street" as precedent for the finding of sufficient state
interest.' 0 5 Hanson, however, treats the employees' interest in being
free from coerced contributions as merely an economic right and
evaluates the infringing statute with a lower level of scrutiny. °6
Consequently, Hanson should not have been relied upon as precedent, because Abood treats the employees' right of free association as
97. R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (principles of federalism dictate that state courts are entitled to the last word on the interpretation of state statutes).

98.
99.
100.

See notes 36, 37 and accompanying text supra.
431 U.S. at 241-42.
Contrast Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) with United States v.

Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 & n.20 (1967) (applying strict overbreadth standards and refusing
to adopt a balancing of interests approach).
101. 431 U.S. at 225.
102. Cf. T. Haggard, supra note 1, at 267 (1977) (decisions on constitutionality of union

security agreements are marked by a lack of analytical and linguistic clarity).
103.

351 U.S. 225 (1956).

104. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
105. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 254 n.9 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
106. See 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956). The Hanson court viewed the statute as primarily
economic since it assumed that the compulsory dues were being used only for collective bargaining activities. The Court therefore treated the question as "one of policy with which the
judiciary has no concern. .. . The task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress
exercises." Id

a fundamental right.' 7 Thus, the PERA should have been subjected
to more exacting scrutiny. Furthermore, the Abood court should not
have relied on the Street decision either, since that decision does not
rest explicitly on the Constitution. °8 While the Street court perceived constitutional questions "of utmost gravity,"" it avoided deciding those questions by adopting a narrow construction of the
Railway Labor Act." 0 Even if the Street court did measure the interests behind the Railway Labor Act, it was measuring the interests
of the United States Congress in dealing with bargaining between
private carriers and their employees, rather than the Michigan Legislature's interests in enacting the 1973 PERA. As Justice Powell observed in his opinion criticizing the Abood plurality, "While these
interests [behind the Railway Labor Act] may well justify encouraging union shop arrangements in the private sector, there is far less
reason to believe they justify the intrusion upon First Amendment
rights that results from compelled support of a union as a condition
of government employment.""' Continuing, Powell noted that "Because this appeal reaches this Court on a motion to dismiss, the record is barren of any demonstration by the State, that excluding
minority views from the processes by which governmental policy is
' 2
made is necessary to serve overriding- governmental objectives." "1
The relaxed scrutiny and imprecise analysis of Abood could set
constitutional analysis on a new course of interest balancing and
away from the exacting scrutiny of traditional overbreadth analysis.
Because of the Court's previous reluctance to nullify union security
provisions, however, it is more likely that the Abood court's relaxed
scrutiny and imprecise analysis will be confined to issues related to
union security." 3 In light of the Supreme Court's failure to apply
strict overbreadth standards in Abood, the Ball court was not compelled to establish any less restrictive burden shifting in its remedy.
107.

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 234.

108. In Abood, the court admitted that "Street embraced an interpretation of the Railway
Labor Act not without its difficulties, . . . precisely to avoid facing the constitutional issues
presented by use of union-shop dues for political and ideological purposes.. " 431 U.S. at
232. The Court's comment that Abood "presents constitutional issues not decided in Hanson
or Street," was made in the context of deciding whether the PERA could constitutionally sanction the use of non-members' fees for noncollective bargaining purposes. Id It was at the
conclusion of the preceding section of the opinion that the Abood Court concluded that "Hanson and Street [are] controlling in the present case insofar as the service charges are applied to
collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes." Id The
Abood opinion's central flaw is its failure to distinguish between (1)the unconstitutional state
action involved when a state agency coerces its employees to contribute to a union, and (2) the
less restrictive action when the government passes a statute allowing private employers to require their employees to contribute to a union. See Note, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
27 CATH. U. L. REV. 132, 145 (1977).

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

367 U.S. at 749.
Id at 750.
431 U.S. at 260-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id at 262.
See note I supra (definitions of various types of "union security").

Fortunately, the Garden City decision provides the opportunity for
MERC to relieve dissenters of the litigation burden that resulted
from Ball
C.

The Escrow Remedy

Because the plaintiffs in Ball maintained the burden of litigation by sufficiently expressing their objections, and because the
union failed to prove its collective bargaining activities, the court
ordered that plaintiffs' agency shop fees be paid into escrow as a
temporary measure to protect their first amendment rights and also
to ensure that the union would have prompt access to the funds to
which it might be entitled after a judicial determination." 4 After the
union establishes the amount of the agency shop fee it may retain,
the objecting non-members will be entitled to a refund of any monies paid in excess of the amount that the union is permitted to retain."' 5 The Ball court recognized that the escrow remedy "works
somewhat of a hardship on the union because temporarily it will be
unable to collect even the portion of service fees to which it is entiby
tled," but the court concluded that such "hardship is out-weighed
' " 16
violated."
be
will
rights
Amendment
First
that
the possibility
Abood held that the first amendment prohibits the spending of
dissenting employees' coerced financial contributions on political activities." 7 Since the spending rather than the retention of the fees is
unconstitutional," restitution of fees after they had been illegally
spent would not remedy the constitutional infraction." 9 Without
this escrow remedy, the union's collection and disbursement of the
agency shop fees prior to a judicial determination of plaintiffs' refund would be uncontrollable from a practical standpoint. 2 0 Permitting the union to collect the fees and possibly to spend them on
impermissible activities would violate the first amendment since the
prior restraint doctrine does not tolerate potential infringement of
first amendment rights prior to a judicial determination except in
limited circumstances. 2 ' Furthermore, Elrod v. Burns established
that even a temporary loss of first amendment rights constitutes ir114. 84 Mich. App. at 397, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
115. Id
116. Id
117. 431 U.S. at 235.
118. 431 U.S. at 232-37. See also Vieira, note 66 supra at 447; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 355 (1976) ("any assessment of [a public employee's] salary is tantamount to coerced
belief").
119. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury").
120. The escrow remedy is sure to prevent impermissible union spending pending outcome of the litigation since the escrow arrangement removes the funds from the union's physical control.
121. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-9 (1965). See also Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970). In Freedman the Court summarized

reparable injury,' 2 2 and other cases have recognized that the timeliness of political speech is of particular importance.' 23 Thus, the
need for the escrow remedy is particularly strong because agency
shop/political spending cases involve prolonged litigation.' 2 4 If the
the prior restraint doctrine as applied to a censor's attempt to distinguish obscenity from free
speech:
[B]ecause only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding insures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. To this end, the exhibitor must be
assured, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a
specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
Any restraint imposed in advance of a final determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution. Moreover, we are well aware that, even after
expiration of a temporary restraint, an administrative refusal to license, signifying the
censor's view that the film is unprotected, may have a discouraging effect on the
exhibitor. Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision,
to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a
license.
380 U.S. at 58-59 (1965) (citations omitted).
The rationale for the Freedman decision has even stronger application in Ball because the
adjudicatory tribunal is appointed by an interested party in the dispute. One commentator has
explained the Freedman rationale as follows:
Freedman's preference for judicial evaluation of First Amendment claims rests upon
the most fundamental considerations - the inherent institutional differences between
courts and administrative agencies, no matter how judicial the administrative proceedings may be. First, long judicial tenure frees judges, in most cases, from direct
political pressures. Judicial insulation encourages impartial decision making; more
importantly, it permits the courts to take the "long view" of issues. Administrative
bodies, particularly at the state level, are rarely so insulated; indeed, they are often
seen primarily as political organs. Second, the role of the administrator is not that of
the impartial adjudicator but that of the expert-a role which necessarily gives an
administrative agency a narrow and restricted viewpoint. . . . Courts alone are institutionally able consistently to discern, and to apply, the values embodied in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process"83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-24 (1970).
Thus, the prior restraint doctrine sets standards to prevent administrative processes from
infringing on first amendment freedoms. Since the process of agency fee collection involves
state action, first amendment prior restraint standards should apply to the union rebate procedure even though it is not adjudication by an administrative agency. Prior restraint standards
protect substantive first amendment freedoms by insuring that the administrative processes
provide for two requirements. First, there must be a judicial determination of whether the
activity is protected by the Constitution. Second, that judicial determination must precede or
immediately follow governmental intervention.
122. 427 U.S. at 373.
123. See Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 391-92 (1962).
124. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 123 (1963). In Allen, the court
noted that the action had "been before the courts for 10 years and has not yet run its course."
373 U.S. at 123. Abood had been before the courts for more than seven years when the
Supreme Court rendered its decision requiring continued litigation. 84 Mich. App. 383, 269
N.W.2d 607.
In Justice Black's dissent from Street he eloquently noted the burdens that the trials in
these cases would entail:
It may be that courts and lawyers with sufficient skill in accounting, algebra, geometry, trigonometry and calculus will be able to extract the proper microscopic answer
from the voluminous and complex accounting records of the local, national and international unions involved. It seems to me, however, that while the Court's remedy
may prove very lucrative to special masters, accountants and lawyers, this formula,
with its attendant trial burdens, promises little hope for financial recompense to the
individual workers whose First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.
Undoubtedly, at the conclusion of this long exploration of accounting intricacies,

defendant union in such a case, for example, were permitted to
spend agency shop fees pending the outcome of eight years of litigation, the union would be able to use the dissenters' money in four
federal election years. Clearly, the subsequent restitution of dissenters' illegally spent fees would not cure the damage resulting from the
unconstitutional union spending.
D.

The Injunction Orders

The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded Ball for a determination of the proportion of union spending that is unrelated to collective bargaining.1 25 The court stated that following the
determination of that proportion, the objecting employees will be en-

titled to (1) the appropriate refund of past fees and, (2) a proportional reduction of future fees. t 26 Therefore, in order to implement
the appellate court's decision, the trial court must issue two injunctions. 12 This double injunctive relief is identical to the remedy
granted by the Supreme Court in Allen. 128 Since Abood ruled that
plaintiffs were entitled to establish their right to the kind of remedy
described in Allen, 129 this aspect of the Ball relief is unassailable.
Because the future fees will be reduced by the proportion set in
a judicial proceeding, the amount of the fees available to the defendant union for spending on impermissible activities will be minimized. 3 ° The danger of impermissible spending would remain,
however, because the proportion of non-collective bargaining spending could rise above the fee reduction established in the initial judicial determination.' 3 ' To avoid that danger, the Ball court declared
many courts could with plausibility dismiss the workers' claims as de minimris when
measured only in dollars and cents. 67 U.S. at 795-96.
125. 84 Mich. App. at 394, 398, 269 N.W.2d at 612, 614.
126. Id at 396, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
127. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963) (requiring lower
court to enter an injunction). The injunction ordering the future reduction of fees should
include the union and the City as addresses and should specifically require the addresses to
refrain from using any formal or informal means of coercing any excess fees from the nonmembers. Such a specific order would deter the union and the City from using the common
tactic of threatening non-members with dismissal for not paying full union dues or fraudulently telling new employees that they must become union members as a condition of holding
their jobs.
128. 373 U.S. at 122.
129. 431 U.S. at 242 (1977).
130. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 396-97, 269 N.W.2d 607, 613.
131. The second part of the Allen remedy reduces future agency fee exactions by the same
proportion as established as the amount of refund due for the year in which suit was brought.
373 U.S. at 122. This part of the remedy would be adequate only if there were a basis for
assuming that the Union's future proportion of political expenditures will always be identical
to the proportion of political expenditures in the year that the dissenters brought suit. Such a
constant proportion of political expenditures does not seem likely however, because political
expenditures are higher in election years than in non-election years. Furthermore, the court's
injunctive relief can not place any limit on the union's political spending because this limit
would violate the first amendment rights of union members. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977).

that "In the future the union should adjust, at least annually, the
service fee reduction according to fluctuations in permissible expenditures."' 32 This additional duty created by the Michigan court
in Ball is essential and must be a part of the injunctive relief
33
granted.
Dissenters wishing to challenge the union's calculations, however, "must first utilize the internal union appellate procedures
before seeking review in the courts."' 1 34 The Ball court reconciled
this "prospective exhaustion of remedies requirement" with its earlier ruling on exhaustion by explaining that "the risk of improper use
of the service fee is minimized by an initialjudicialdeterminationand
subsequentfee reductions. .. 1 While this language is somewhat
ambiguous, one can infer from the context that the term "subsequent
fee reductions" refers to fee reductions by the judicially-determined
proportion. The court's explanation therefore establishes that the
union's adjustments may not lower the fee reduction below the initial judicial determination. In other words, the union's adjustments
can only make additional reductions to dissenters' fees in correspondence with fluctuations above the amount of the judicially-determined reduction. Ball does not permit the union unilaterally to raise
36
the amount of dissenters' service fee by lowering the reduction.
Ball's discussion of future fee reduction is so brief that the
union could argue that the opinion gives it the power to lower the
reduction below the level set in the initial judicial determination. If
the union could lower the reduction to such a level the risk that the
union would make improper determinations of the future reductions
would be restored. In fact, if the union is permitted this reduction,
and the dissenters dispute it, the union would be in a position to
argue that dissenters should be required to exhaust the internal
union remedies. Such an interpretation of Ball's future reduction
ruling is obviously unreasonable since it is entirely inconsistent with
Ball's initial ruling rejecting the exhaustion requirement. 37 The
only way Ball's future reduction and prospective exhaustion require132. 84 Mich. App. at 396, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
133. Cf.Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963) (requiring lower
court to enter an injunction). The duty of providing an accurate fee reduction would be illusory unless the union is enjoined to comply with that duty. The potential liability of contempt
provides incentive for the union to make a good faith effort at protecting dissentor's rights.
134. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 396-97, 269 N.w.2d 607, 613.
135. Id at 397, 269 N.W.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
136. The remedy chosen by the federal court in Beck v. CW4 is simpler. 468 F. Supp. 93
(D. Md. 1978). According to the Beck court, plaintiffs are entitled to "an injunction against
future collection of amounts authorized by the agency shop clause in excess of the amount
necessary for [collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment]." Id
at 97. Under this type of injunction, the union would have the burden of monitoring fluctuations in the proportion of impermissible spending since it would be liable for contempt if it
collected any amounts exceeding the amount necessary for the three enumerated purposes.
137. 84 Mich. App. at 396-97, 269 N.W.2d at 613.

ment can be reconciled is if the initial judicially-determined reduction prevents the union from unilaterally lowering the fee below the
judicially-determined level. This interpretation of Ball is also supported by the court's recognition that its remedy had to conform
with the controlling principles of Abood and the requirement in the
Allen case that the reductions of future fees should be by the same
proportion as the judicially-determined refund.' 3 8 Consequently,
Ball's injunction ordering union-determined adjustments of future
reductions substantially adds to the judicially-determined reductions.
To illustrate how the Ball remedy operates, suppose that a
union is spending 70% of its dues on permissible collective bargaining activities and 30% on impermissible non-collective bargaining
activities. Suppose further that it is reducing its dissenters' service
fees by only 1%. Ball holds that the objecting non-members are entitled to a judicial determination of the true level of union spending
on impermissible activities. If the union is only able to prove that
70% of its spending, is for permissible activities, the court should order the union to refund 30% of service fees to non-members and to
reduce all future service fees by that same amount. If the next year,
the proportion of impermissible spending decreased to 20%, the
union would still only collect service fees at the 70% level, unless it
requested the court to amend the injunction to lower the reduction to
20% in correspondence with the new proportion of spending. On the
other hand, if the next year's proportion of impermissible spending
increased to 40%, the judicially-determined service fees would still
be 70%, but the union would be under an obligation to make an
additional good faith reduction of the other 10%. If the non-members challenged the good faith reduction of 10%, Ball's prospective
exhaustion requirement would require them to utilize the union appellate procedures before they could seek judicial review.
Thus, the risk of improper use of the service fees is minimized
by the initial judicial determination and subsequent fee reduction.
The union's obligation to rebate future service fees in correspondence with fluctuations in non-collective bargaining spending provides some assurance that little, if any, of the service fee paid by an
objecting non-member will be used, even temporarily, to finance activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Additionally, the possibility of continual judicial supervision is avoided by requiring
dissenters challenging the union rebates to exhaust internal union
appellate procedures before seeking review in the courts.
The Ball remedy could have significant impact on union politi138.

Id at 391-92, 269 N.W.2d at 611.

cal spending (an estimated $100,000,000 during 1976). 119 At least
seventeen states have adopted statutes authorizing forced unionization of public employees' 4° and the Ball remedy could be used to
restrain unconstitutional spending under union security agreements
in each of those states. Because Abood established that the constitutional limits applicable to the PERA are identical to the limits applicable to the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations
Act,1 4' a federal court recently ruled that a union security agreement
under a federal law is subject to a remedy similar to the remedy
42
granted in Ball 1
IV.
A.

Conclusion
Ball's Compliance with Abood

The adequacy of the Ball remedy must be measured by the adequacy of its protection of the rights recognized in Abood That portion of the remedy ordering a refund of the proportion of past fees
spent on impermissible activities cannot remedy the wrong done by
the union's impermissible spending prior to the refund. 43 On the
other hand, dissenters' first amendment rights are fully protected
during the litigation period because Ball's escrow order prevents the
possibility of impermissible spending by the union prior to a judicial
139.
140.

D. CADDY, ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR PAYOFF (1976).
ALASKA STAT. § 23,49110(b); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3546 (West); CAL. GOV'T CODE

§ 3515.5 (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 89-3 and 89-4; Ky. REV.
STAT. § 345.050(1)(c); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 150E, § 12 (Michie/Law Co-op); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 26, § 1027(3); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (West);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1605(1)(c); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW (McKinney) §§ 201.2(a),
201.2(b), and 201.4; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.650 and 243.666; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 1101.301(18) 1101.401 and 1101.705 (Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-2; R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-9.4-8; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.3-7; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1722 and 1726; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 41.56.122; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.16.100; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(6)
(West); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.70(l)(h), (2) (West).
141. 431 U.S. at 240.
142. Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979).
Because the constitutional limits are the same for the PERA and the National Labor
Relations Act, Garden City's ruling on unfair labor practices under the PERA should be persuasive precedent for unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act. Compare

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 10(l)(c) (1978) with 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(2) (1978). If it would be
overly restrictive for the National Labor Relations Act to leave dissenters with the burden of
litigation in order to protect their right of free association, the National Labor Relations Board
should assume that burden on behalf of dissenters in the private sector. Those unions that
cannot justify their expenditures in response to dissenters' objections should be charged with
committing an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(2) (1978). As in Garden City, the Ballremedy would be the appropriate remedy for these unfair labor practices. Since effective enforcement in these political
spending cases requires thorough investigation, the Board rules would have to provide for
discovery as liberal as that provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Garden City's relevance to union security arrangements under the Railway Labor Act is
less clear because that statute does not provide for any direct analogs to the NLRB, MERC or

the unfair labor practices. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (1978).
143. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Of course the refund order is still the best
remedy available because the injury is irreparable.

determination. The injunction ordering a reduction of future fees by
the judicially-determined proportion merely affords partial protection of dissenters' rights. This portion of the Ball remedy would be
insufficient by itself, because a duty to reducefuture fees by the proportion of impermissible spending in the past would not precisely
correlate with the dissenters' right not to contribute any portion of
their fees for the unions impermissible spending. However, if one
evaluates the judicially-determined reduction together with the injunction requiring the union to adjust the future rebates according to
future fluctuations in impermissible spending, then the Ball remedy
more closely correlates to the right recognized in Abood
Nevertheless, the Ball remedy fails to correlate completely with
Abood. As the Ball court recognized, the union adjustment remedy
still permits the possibility that some of the dissenters' service fees
might be used to finance impermissible spending.'" The principal
danger in a union adjustment scheme is that the union may not
make a good faith determination of the reduction, and, with an exhaustion requirement, the rebate scheme might become a device for
delaying dissenters' access to the courts. The union determination of
the adjustment is clearly less impartial than an annual judicial determination of the adjustment. Even though the possibility of a contempt citation will encourage the union to make an accurate
adjustment it still has an interest in keeping the reduction as low as
possible. Additionally, because the adjustments occur annually, the
union can engage in impermissible spending subject only to the later
reductions of fees at the end of each year.
The Ball court adopted the union adjustment scheme because of
its desire to avoid continual judicial supervision. 45 Overbreadth
analysis, however, would not permit even the limited infringement
of rights under the union adjustment scheme unless the infringement
were justified by compelling state interests." 4 Since the interest in
avoiding judicial supervision is not compelling,' 4 7 the Ball court followed Abood's erroneous balancing approach by permitting infringement of fundamental rights to be outweighed by judicial
expedience.
B.

Alternative Remedies

Under the.Ball decision, dissenters have the burden of initiating
litigation as a condition to protecting their rights of free association;
144. Ball v. Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 397, 269 N.W.2d 607, 613.
145. *84 Mich. App. at 397, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
146. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960).
147. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 & n.8 (1972).

a result that is overly restrictive.' 48 If, however, MERC diligently
assumes that burden under Garden City's ruling on unfair labor
practices, then the PERA's overbreadth will be significantly cured.
Nonetheless, there are other alternatives to the Ball and Garden City
remedies. For example, it is possible to construe the PERA as having an implied duty of reasonable rebate or fee reduction. 49 Under
this duty, plaintiffs whose rights have been infringed under agency
shop agreements could sue for punitive damages when the violations
were willful or malicious. This possibility of punitive damages
would provide some measure of assurance that the unions would
seek to avoid constitutionally impermissible spending even before
they become subject to an injunction resulting from litigation initiated by the dissenters. A duty of fee reduction is consistent with the
logic of Ball and thus could be relied on to remedy other agency
shop agreements in future cases under the Michigan PERA.
This duty was not discussed in the Ball opinion since the court
concerned itself only with the group of dissenters in the bargaining
unit at issue. Although the Ball injunctions afford reasonable protection to that one group of dissenters, the protection afforded other
dissenters derives only from Ball's value as precedent. Consequently, in the wake of Abood and Ball, when the state's interest in
coercing service fees infringes on first amendment, employees striving to secure their right of free association must still swim the tide of
prolonged and expensive litigation.
An ideal remedy for the overbroad agency shop statute would
minimize dissenters' burden of litigation and at the same time guarantee that none of their agency fees would be used, even temporarily, for unconstitutional spending. A simple way to achieve that
goal, short of voiding the statute, is to require that unions finance
their non-collective bargaining expenditures from strictly voluntary
This remedy would involve two injunction orders.
contributions.'
The first order would require all unions participating in an agency
shop under the PERA to segregate funds spent on their collective
bargaining activities from funds spent on their non-collective bargaining activities. The second order would require that the non-collective bargaining activities be financed only with voluntary
contributions and not with contributions coerced from objecting
non-members.
148. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (unconstitutional burden for
government to require addressee to request delivery of foreign unsealed mail detained by Post
Office as communist political propaganda); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration requirement is unconstitutional burden on union organizer's first amendment rights). See
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970).
149. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (duty of fair representation
added to Railway Labor Act in response to suit raising constitutional questions).
150. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 589 n.5.

This remedy minimizes dissenters' burden of litigation since the
order could include all unions participating in agency shop agreements under the appropriate legislation. The remedy does not exceed the scope of the court's authority to decide only actual cases or
controversies for the same reason that the overbreadth doctrine permits courts to strike down a statute on its face rather than as applied.' 5 ' Actually, this remedy would minimize judicial interference
with legislative prerogatives since it does not frustrate the legislature's arguably legitimate interests in coercing financial contributions for union collective bargaining expenditures. Finally, the
remedy completely respects the constitutional right of union members and sympathetic non-members to associate voluntarily in political and ideological pursuits.
C

Impact of Ball and Abood on ConstitutionalAnasis

Because the Ball decision requires that the dissenters assume the
burden of litigation, it is possible that the courts will permit other
statutes to impose similar burdens on the free exercise of first
amendment rights. In light of the Supreme Court's failure to apply
strict overbreadth standards in Abood, 52 however, the Ball court
could not have been expected to create any less restrictive relief with
regard to burden shifting. Fortunately, Garden City permits MERC
to lessen that burden by seeking the Ball remedy on behalf of the
dissenters. On the other hand, in leaving dissenters' future adjustments to be decided by the unions rather than the courts, the Ball
opinion followed Abood's balancing approach by permitting judicial
expedience to outweigh the infringement of the fundamental rights.
Perhaps Ball and Abood will be remembered as early cases setting constitutional analysis on a new course of a balancing approach
to constitutional decisionmaking. If constitutional analysis were
about to begin such a voyage, one could only hope that fundamental
rights would not be swept overboard without the protective bulwarks
of strict overbreadth analysis. Nonetheless, the relaxed scrutiny of
Ball and Abood will probably be confined to the context of union
security issues, and most statutes infringing fundamental rights will
still be subjected to the exacting scrutiny of overbreadth analysis.

151. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967) ("It is no answer
[to a claim of overbreadth] to say that the statute would not be applied in such a case"). See
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadh Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 863-65
(1970).
152. 431 U.S. at 238 (1977).

